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1. Introduction 
 
Successive UK governments, like their counterparts in the US, The Netherlands and elsewhere have 
attempted to use tax-based incentives to correct a perceived market failure in the provision of finance to 
small, unquoted companies. One such scheme in the UK promotes the use of Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs). 
An explicit aim of the VCT legislation is the provision of an exit strategy to investors thereby reducing one 
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source of the potential market failure (HM Inland Revenue, 2002). Consequently, VCTs are required to be 
listed on the London Stock Exchange. We report, however, that the secondary market in VCT shares is 
characterised by low levels of market liquidity as indicated by typically low trading volumes. This paper 
examines whether investors’ pricing and trading decisions can be explained in terms of tax considerations 
and, therefore, whether the design of the VCT legislation (and associated tax legislation) is a potential cause 
of the low liquidity. 
 
Individuals investing in a VCT IPO receive a number of conditional tax incentives including, most 
significantly, ‘investment relief’, an income tax rebate based on the sum initially invested. To reduce the 
potential benefits of ‘tax avoidance’, a repayment or ‘clawback’ of the rebate can arise if the shares in the 
VCT are sold within a ‘required holding’ period (HM Treasury, 2003). This paper derives a model of the 
present value of the conditional tax incentive during the currency of the required holding period, and then 
tests empirically a number of predictions about market behaviour based on this model. 
 
The issue of the impact of taxation on asset prices has been subject to considerable academic 
investigation. There remains, however, a lack of consensus over, in particular, the impact of investor level 
taxes share prices. A main source of the controversy revolves around identifying the tax status of the price 
setting or marginal investor. Further difficulty arises from distinguishing between competing effects. For 
example, in studies of UK markets, while Ang et al. (1991) and Chui et al. (1992) conclude that investor 
level taxes are reflected in gross yields, Morgan and Thomas (1998) dispute the validity of a tax-based 
explanation, suggesting dividend signalling effects and a delayed related price reaction as alternatives. The 
lack of consensus internationally on the impact of investor level taxes is evidenced in Harris and Kemsley 
(1999), Harris et al. (2001), Collins and Kemsley (2000), Dhaliwal et al. (2003) and Hanlon et al. (2003). 
More fundamentally, questions pertain as to the efficiency of markets with respect to taxation. In studies of 
US markets, Cutler (1988) concluded that ‘results leave unanswered questions about … whether [tax] news 
was efficiently incorporated into stock prices’; and Elton et al. (2004) found indications that ‘individuals 
either do not pay attention to taxes or are unaware of the differences across funds and their predictability’. 
Hubbard and Michaely (1997) raised similar concerns. 
 
We address the effect of investor level taxes by examining their influence on disposal timing decisions 
and the resulting effect on price, i.e. investigating the existence and extent of a ‘lock-in effect’. Such an 
effect typically arises when the taxation of gains is on a realised basis and, consequently, provides investors 
with an incentive to defer realisation of the gain (Devereux and Freedman, 2008, Stiglitz, 2000). In the 
context of capital gains tax in the UK, a lock-in effect may be exacerbated by the availability of taper relief, 
which reduces the effective rate of tax with reference to the length of ownership. Lock-in effects can arise in 
other tax settings, for example, under corporation tax settings in the context of disposal of assets on which 
capital or investment allowances have been granted; or in the context of the decision as to whether or not to 
continue trading where there exist past trading taxation losses which are yet to be utilised. 
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Although studies find evidence of pricing consequences of a lock-in effect, e.g. Klein (2001) and Blouin 
et al. (2002), such studies necessarily rely on assumptions about the date of asset acquisition in order to 
estimate the tax cost of the lock in effect associated that a particular asset (although an exception is 
Landsman and Shackelford, 1995, who had access to confidential shareholder records which allowed them to 
calculate shareholder-specific tax liabilities by specific shareholder). However, the structure of VCTs in the 
UK allows a research methodology which overcomes the above limitations as discussed below. In other 
setting to overcome the above limitation regarding a pricing effect, more recent research has focused on 
relative trading volumes to find evidence of a lock in effect, e.g. Ayers et al. (2008).  
 
Our analysis of bid-ask spreads confirm the existence of a lock-in effect, consistent with findings of low 
trading volumes, and have direct policy relevance on two aspects. First, the resulting disincentive to trade 
reduces liquidity, thereby potentially reducing VCTs’ ability to attract funding and increasing their cost of 
capital; and second, the lock-in effect inhibits VCT investors from re-investing in more profitable activities, 
thus creating a welfare loss (Stiglitz, 2000) and related increased agency costs.. The results may be 
summarized as follows. First, VCT bid-ask spreads evolve over time in a way consistent with investment 
relief being capitalised, and the bid-ask spread increases as the present value of the investment relief 
increases. As the present value increases over time, VCT shareholders require an increasingly higher price if 
they are to sell within the required holding period and, thus, forfeit their investment relief. Potential 
secondary market purchasers, however, are not entitled to investment relief and are, therefore, only willing to 
pay a price that is independent of any investment relief consideration. Second, VCT spreads fall significantly 
and the number of customer bargains increases significantly following the end of the required holding 
period, consistent with the cessation of the lock-in effect. Third, spread is greater for VCTs with a three-year 
as opposed to a five-year required holding period, consistent with the present value of the investment relief 
being higher the shorter the holding period. And fourth, VCT spread and volume traded are, respectively, 
greater than and less than spread and volume traded for a non-VCT comparator sample (for which 
comparator sample, in the absence of specific tax incentives, there is no tax-related required holding period). 
We argue that our results present stronger evidence of a lock-in effect than do many previous studies, this 
being facilitated by the setting for our work. 
 
In addition to its policy relevance, our study contributes to the lock-in literature principally in three 
respects. First, we calculate the magnitude of the lock-in effect with certainty, yet without reference to 
underlying shareholder records, which allows examination of a broader sample than would be likely to be 
available were access to confidential shareholders’ records required. Second, we adopt a time series 
approach, in view of the time varying magnitude of the potential lock-in effect, and thereby avoid control 
issues involved in cross-sectional analysis of the effects of taxation on pricing. And third, we focus on 
changes in the bid-ask spread rather than, for example, mid price, and so reduce the impact of changes in the 
market value of the instruments under consideration in the analysis. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section discusses VCTs and associated taxation regulation; the 
third section develops a theoretical model for the valuation of VCT investment relief; the fourth section 
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describes the data, hypothesis and research method; the results are presented and discussed in the fifth 
section; and the final section concludes. 
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2. Legislative and institutional background 
 
Legislation establishing VCTs was included in the UK Finance Act 1995, and the first VCT was created in 
November 1995. The term ‘trust’ is, strictly, a misnomer, since, in order to be approved as VCTs under the 
Finance Act 1995, they are required to be public limited companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange.1 
Approval under the 1995 Act results in two distinct sets of tax reliefs: shareholder-level reliefs and firm-level 
reliefs. Critical to this analysis, shareholder-level reliefs are restricted to private individuals, thereby 
excluding the possibility that the (rational) marginal shareholder could be a tax-exempt organisation, since 
such organisations would be unwilling to pay a share price subsuming shareholder-level reliefs which are of 
no value to them.2 The terms of approval are given in S.70, Finance Act 1995, and are primarily concerned 
with the composition of the assets held by the VCT3, size of holding4 and size of companies in which it 
invests.5 The legislation also specifies approved trades, in order to direct investment away from relatively 
low risk asset-backed investment ventures towards risky activities which may, otherwise, experience 
difficulty in attracting investment. 
 
The requirement that all VCTs must be quoted on the London Stock Exchange is designed to provide 
investors with a ready market for assets with typically illiquid underlying investments and thereby reduce the 
risks associated with unquoted investments.6, 7 Individual investors may obtain a number of tax reliefs when 
investing in VCTs. Original subscribers (but not secondary market purchasers) can obtain income tax relief 
at a rate of 20 percent on the cost of their original investment (referred to as ‘investment relief’ for the 
purposes of this paper) conditional upon the shares being held by the individual for a required holding 
period. This required holding period was originally five years, but was reduced (non-retrospectively) to three 
years for seasoned and unseasoned issues occurring on or after 6th April 2000. If the shares are disposed of 
before the expiration of the required holding period a ‘clawback’ of the income tax occurs, based on the 
lesser of the amount invested or disposal proceeds. Additionally, a subscription to acquire VCT shares can, 
subject to certain conditions being satisfied, be used to defer a tax gain realised on a non-VCT asset. 
Following the introduction in the UK Finance Act 1998 of taper relief (for capital gains tax calculation 
purposes), the ability to defer a gain is now of less significance to potential investors, particularly in relation 
to gains on business assets. 8 
 
Further relief is given by an exemption from capital gains tax in respect of any gain on disposal of shares 
in VCTs, and by exemption from income tax upon dividends received from VCTs. For the purpose of this 
paper, these two reliefs are together referred to as ‘return reliefs’. The return reliefs are available to all 
individual UK tax paying shareholders9, irrespective of whether they acquired their shareholding by direct 
subscription or by purchase in the subsequent secondary market. 
 
Therefore, in subscribing for shares in a VCT an investor is acquiring four distinct assets or rights: (i) a 
share of the VCT’s net assets; (ii) the right to investment relief; (iii) the possibility of roll-over relief; and 
(iv) the right to return reliefs. Of these, the second and third cannot be acquired by a secondary market 
purchaser. 
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Since a subscriber forfeits the right to investment relief upon selling VCT shares within the required 
holding period, and since investment relief may not be transferred to purchasers in the secondary market, we 
deduce that the secondary market in a VCT share will be characterised by high bid-ask spread and low 
trading volume during the required holding period for that share. A market maker will only offer to sell VCT 
shares for a price at which he/she can readily obtain (or replace) such shares in the market: this price will 
include, to some extent, an element reflecting the value of investment relief rights of original subscribers. 
Potential purchasers, by contrast, will place no value on investment relief and will not be prepared to pay for 
it. Once the required holding period for the share is over, we may expect to see a lower bid-ask spread and 
consequently higher trading volume. 
 
We would expect, therefore, that the quoted prices for VCTs in the secondary market to comprise the 
following elements: market value of underlying VCT assets; conventional discount (or premium) upon the 
market value of underlying assets, as per the literature on investment trusts in general; expected value of 
return reliefs; conventional market makers’ spread; and spread attributable to the expected value of 
investment reliefs. 
 
Table 1 sets out the number of VCT share issues by fiscal year since 1995/96, split for 1997/98 onwards 
between issues of VCT shares new to the market, and those which are further issues of pre-listed shares. An 
economically significant amount, over £3.3 billion, has been raised by the issue of VCTs new to listing and 
(typically smaller value) further issues; and the UK government provided £60 million in 2008/09 (£80 
million in 2007/08) for example in respect of the loss of income tax in respect of venture capital trust relief 
(HM Treasury, 2009a). The government has stated that VCTs, along with certain other investment vehicles, 
‘remain a vital component of the Government’s strategy to support investment’ and that the UK government 
‘is confident that they will continue to encourage substantial investment into small companies which is vital 
to our economic recovery’ (HM Treasury, 2009b). 
 
*** insert Table 1 about here *** 
 
The apparent importance of the tax benefits to shareholders is evidenced in that almost a quarter of VCT 
share issues occurred between the beginning of March and 5th April, late in the fiscal year, reducing 
uncertainty over individuals’ tax positions and marginal tax rates, and also minimising financing costs. 
Based on a survey of 496 VCT investors, ‘the single most attractive feature’ of the scheme is the income tax 
relief based on the initial subscription (41% of investors) followed by the CGT deferral (23% of investors); 
whereas the income tax exemption on dividends and the CGT exemption on disposal of shares in VCTs were 
described as ‘the single most attractive feature’ of VCTs by 4% and 18% of investors respectively (PACEC, 
2003). 
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3. Valuation of VCT investment relief 
 
We turn now to the formulation of a theoretical model for valuation of investment relief. Consider an 
individual investor, UK resident for taxation purposes, who subscribes amount I in a VCT at time t0 during 
fiscal year FY0, on which amount he/she expects income tax relief at rate T0  
 
The value of investment relief is not certain to the investor until the end of the required holding period 
since, for example, the investor’s circumstances may change and he or she may become a distressed seller. 
Suppose that: 
 
(i) the risk free rate is f per time period 
(ii) personal taxation payable in respect of fiscal year FYi is due at time t’i (in the UK, personal 
taxation is payable by 31st January following the fiscal year to which the tax relates) 
(iii) the rate of interest upon tax ‘clawed back’ in respect of tax reliefs previously enjoyed but, 
retrospectively, no longer allowable is c per period (simple interest, as under tax legislation) and 
(iv) the rate per period which represents the discount rate for risk appropriate to investment relief is r 
 
The cash flow benefit of investment relief is, therefore, IT0, to be enjoyed at time t’0. The value of this 
investment relief to the investor in the period before he/she receives the cash flow benefit is the expected 
benefit appropriately discounted. In the period after receiving the cash flow benefit, but whilst still within the 
required holding period, the value is the potential liability for overdue tax (i.e., the cash outflow which will 
be suffered should the VCT holding be sold)10. Once beyond this holding period, the value disappears. 
 
The VCT subscriber, however, might divest the holding (or part thereof) before the end of the required 
holding period for a price which is below the original subscription price. In such a case the ‘clawback’ of 
investment relief is restricted to divestment proceeds at the income tax relief rate previously enjoyed, plus 
interest. So in the period between point of cash flow benefit and end of the required holding period, the 
valuation of investment relief is not based, necessarily, on the amount originally invested, I; but, rather, on 
the lesser of this and the bid price, Pbid, at the time of divestment; that is, on min(I, Pbid). 
 
More formally, the value of investment relief, which we denote VIR, is as follows over three periods 
(period from point of investment up to point of cash flow benefit; period between point of cash flow benefit 
and end of the required holding period; and period from end of the required holding period): 
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where { ab − } represents the number of discounting/compounding periods from time point a to time point b 
(so, for example, {t’0 – t} represents the number of days from point t to the point of enjoyment of the cash 
flow benefit of investment relief); Y represents the number of discounting/compounding periods in a year; 
and N represents the length in years of the required holding period. Notice that in the period prior to t’0 no 
adjustment is made in respect of restricted clawback, since there is a zero assumed clawback during this 
period (the investor is assumed not to have claimed/enjoyed the cash benefit of investment relief). This leads 
to the profile of investment relief valuation over time as shown in Figure 1 (which figure, for simplicity of 
profile, assumes that the bid price is always in excess of or equal to the initial subscription price). In the 
figure, the height of the profile at time t0 (vertical axis intercept) represents the value of investment relief, 
according the above model, at the point of investment in the VCT. 
 
*** insert Figure 1 about here *** 
 
The middle section of model (1) may be rewritten to separate out the limitation in VIR attributable to Pbid 
falling below I, decomposing VIR into (additive) parts VIRA (‘full’ VIR) and VIRB as follows:11 
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We now consider what the proceeds of sale are likely to be in the context of market maker’s bid or offer 
prices. The ‘standard market maker’s spread’ covers the market maker’s transactions costs, adjustment for 
operational risk, normal profits, etc. The market maker must post bid and offer prices at which he/she is 
prepared to trade. Faced with a buy order, the market maker must obtain shares and cannot, in the normal 
course, rely upon finding a financially distressed seller willing to part with his VCT shares without being 
recompensed for the value of investment relief. Therefore the offer (as relative to the bid) price will include 
not only standard market maker’s spread, but also a valuation of investment relief. Conversely, the market 
9 
makers bid price reflects the fact that he anticipates selling VCT shares onwards on the secondary market to 
an investor who will not be able to enjoy, and therefore does not value, investment relief. 
 
The valuation of market maker’s bid/offer spread (which we can observe) follows from the above as: 
 
VIR + standard market maker’s spread
 
(3) 
 
A further impactor upon the theoretical model might be the valuation of roll-over relief available to VCT 
subscribers. This may also be valued, along with investment relief, within the overall market maker’s spread, 
and abstracting from this may mean that model (3) under estimates market maker’s bid/offer spread. Roll-
over relief value is, however, highly investor specific and difficult to estimate. It is also likely to be at least 
an order of magnitude lower than the value of investment relief (being the discount rate in respect of 
payment deferral applied to a tax rate in turn applied to a principal sum). 
 
 
4. Data, hypotheses and methodology 
 
4.1 Data set 
 
The determination of the data set was influenced by the necessity for sufficient within-VCT-required-
holding-period data points. For each VCT, such points commence approximately ten months after the end of 
the tax year in which the VCT is established. 
 
The entire population of VCT shares which had been listed up to and including January 2008 was 
extracted from the Primary Market Fact Sheet published monthly by the London Stock Exchange, double 
checked against TrustNet, Reuters and Datastream databases. This provided a sample of 137 VCT shares.12 
 
For every LSE-traded instrument for each VCT in the sample, all available daily data from 27th August 
1996 to 25th March 2008 (inclusive) for market maker’s closing ask price (which we denote PA), market 
maker’s closing bid price (PB), number of customer bargains and number of shares traded in customer 
bargains were obtained direct from London Stock Exchange, through bespoke interrogation of LSE 
databases by LSE staff.13 
 
Although VCTs have a number of unique characteristics, there are some financial instruments which 
invest in similar areas and are listed. Two comparator samples of listed investment trust stocks were selected 
by searching the TrustNet database: searching for ‘UK Venture/Development Capital’ investment trusts 
yielded fifteen trusts; and searching for ‘UK Equity Growth’ investment trusts yielded 27 trusts. All 
available daily data items as above were collected for these comparator samples. 
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For each sample VCT, its listing date was established from the LSE Primary Market Fact Sheets and the 
date of the end of the required holding period deduced. Where multiple allocations of a single VCT share 
class were made, the date of the first listing date was taken as the subscription date in order to maintain an 
assumption that market makers are rational and would not wish to under value the spread; and where a single 
VCT had multiple LSE-listed shares, the first subscribed was retained in the VCT sample. Where a single 
comparator had multiple LSE-listed shares, that with the longest time series of observations available was 
retained in the comparator sample. 
 
For each sample VCT and comparator, the price spread was calculated for each day upon which bid and 
ask price data was collected: 
 
ttt PBPASPREAD −=  (4) 
 
The samples were then trimmed of observations where either PA or PB was zero, or where SPREAD was 
negative (i.e, observations with no economic rationale). Further, the comparator samples were trimmed of 
observations where PB was less than one pence.14 The final VCT sample comprised 108 VCT shares, with an 
aggregate of 148,628 daily observations for SPREAD; the venture/development capital comparator sample 
comprised fifteen shares with an aggregate of 26,442 daily observations for SPREAD; and the equity growth 
comparator sample comprised 27 shares with an aggregate of 44,489 daily observations for SPREAD.15 
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
 
The special taxation treatments associated with VCTs, and the 6th April 2000 non-retrospective reduction in 
required holding period from five years, provide a context in which we may formulate and test hypotheses 
concerning the impact of tax considerations on valuation and market behaviour. The null hypothesis in each 
case is one of no such impact. 
 
Given valuation of investment relief by initial subscribers, we hypothesise as follows: 
 
Hypothesis A: The bid-ask spread of VCTs within the required holding period is higher than that for 
conventional investment trusts. 
 
Since investment relief is forfeit if a subscriber sells their VCT holding within the required holding period, 
and trades in this period are, therefore, likely to be infrequent: 
 
Hypothesis B: The volume of VCT shares traded within the required holding period is lower than that 
for conventional investment trusts. 
 
Since investment relief is certain for the subscriber as from the end of the required holding period: 
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Hypothesis C: The bid-ask spread of VCTs falls immediately at the end of the required holding period, 
and remains at lower levels thereafter. 
 
Also since investment relief is certain as from the end of the required holding period, i.e., is not forfeit is if a 
subscriber sells their VCT holding, trades are likely to be more frequent after the end of the required holding 
period than they are within the required holding period: 
 
Hypothesis D: The volume of VCT shares traded after the end of the required holding period is higher 
than during that during the required holding period. 
 
From our modelling in the previous section, and focussing upon the magnitude (rather than merely the 
existence) of a pricing effect: 
 
Hypothesis E: The bid-ask spread of VCTs includes a valuation of investment relief which is 
characterised by the theoretical modelling in the previous section. 
 
At the date of subscribing in a VCT the present value of the conditional investment relief will be higher the 
shorter the required holding period, because of the discounting process; and given a shorter required holding 
period, ceteris paribus, the valuation of investment relief during the early life of a VCT will be higher: 
 
Hypothesis F: The bid-ask spread over the first three years of the required holding period of VCTs 
subscribed prior to the reduction in required holding period (from five to three years) is less than the 
bid-ask spread over the required holding period of VCTs subscribed after the reduction. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
 
We commence by observation of the evolution of the mean SPREAD variable for VCTs in relation to the 
period to/since the end of the required holding period; and test for a structural break at the end of the 
required holding period as suggested by our hypotheses C and E. 
 
Next, we consider in more detail descriptive statistics upon spread and volume data for our samples, 
segmented in various ways, and undertake comparison of means between various subsamples. This includes 
descriptive statistics and comparable estimates for our comparator samples: although we may not assume 
that the comparators provide a perfect control, they are sufficient for the limited objective of comparing the 
general size of spreads and the amount of trading activity. 
 
We then undertake regression analysis aiming to model SPREAD, subsuming valuation of investment 
relief per our theoretical model. The objective of this analysis is to examine whether or not VCT spread 
evolves over the course of the required holding period in the manner anticipated and also whether or not the 
spread for VCTs is influenced by other factors in a manner similar to that for other stocks/investment 
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vehicles. This section now continues with discussion of development of our sample for regression purposes 
and of development of a reasonable, estimable regression model. 
 
The value of investment relief variable VIR was computed by reference to the model developed in the 
previous section. This describes the theoretical valuation of the investment relief, including adjustments for 
the rate of interest applied on overdue (clawed back) tax. 
 
We must account also for other factors which may further affect the bid-ask spread. Stoll (1989) 
decomposes the spread on stocks into three factors: those related to adverse information, to the costs of 
holding inventory and to costs of processing orders. This is corroborated by Glosten (1987), who 
decomposes the spread into portions attributable to information asymmetry and ‘other’ elements 
(encompassing the factors of Stoll). Our estimates more closely follow the approach of Atkins and Dyl 
(1997), who do not include an adverse information effect in their estimates of the spread. The existence of 
and ability to exploit informational advantages in VCTs is theorised to be relatively small. The directors of 
the VCT may be in a position to exploit informational advantages being better aware of the holdings of the 
VCT. Directors’ stockholdings as disclosed in various VCT annual reports are, however, typically very small 
and change only very rarely. We therefore include only factors related to inventory and processing costs in 
the empirical model. 
 
Atkins and Dyl (1997) model spread as: 
 
tttt VRETMVALSPREAD εββα +++= 21  (5) 
 
where MVAL represents market value, VRET represents the variance of returns and ε  is a stochastic error 
term. Atkins and Dyl, modelling SPREAD as the first stage in a two-stage estimation of holding period, and 
facing issues of simultaneity, also include a lagged SPREAD as an instrumental variable. It is inappropriate, 
however, to include lagged SPREAD in our formulation: we proceed below to add VIR as an independent 
variable, whose generating process has a significant autoregressive element; the inclusion of lagged SPREAD 
would, therefore, conflate with VIR, and bias the estimated coefficients. Further, Atkins and Dyl estimated 
their model in a cross-sectional and time series context, whereas we employ our final model to individual 
VCT time series. 
 
The greater the market value of the firm, the greater the assumed depth of the market and, consequently, 
the lower the inventory costs (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1988). Consequently the expected sign on the 
coefficient 1β  is negative. The higher the variance of returns the higher the risk associated with holding the 
stock and the greater the inventory costs. Therefore, the expected sign on coefficient 2β  is positive. 
 
This model needs adaptation for our purposes because few VCTs are particularly large and the depth of 
the market is expected to change more with the performance of the VCT since inception than with the market 
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value of the firm. The increased flows into high performing managed funds are well documented in the 
literature (see, for example Sirri and Tufano (1998)). Therefore, price is taken as a proxy for willingness to 
buy and hence the depth of the market. The variance of the stock over the previous 30 days is included as a 
measure of inventory costs, after Atkins and Dyl. Where available in our data set, other measures of market 
depth are included in the form of the number and volume of customer bargains in the previous 30 days. This 
gives an estimable models as follows: 
 
ttttttt VOLBARVBPBVIRSPREAD εβββββα ++++++= 54321  (6) 
 
where VIR represents the valuation effect of investment relief based upon our theoretical model; PB bid 
price; VB variance of the bid price over the previous 30 days (i.e., t-30 to t-1); BAR the number of customer 
bargains over the previous 30 days; and VOL the number of shares traded in customer bargains over the 
previous 30 days. 
 
VIR is calculated from expression (1) with the following assumptions and substitutions: t’i in respect of 
any fiscal year FYi is 31st January in the fiscal year immediately following (this being the due date for 
personal taxation in the UK, and the rational payment date for tax payers in a net payment position); Ti is 
20% or 40%, according to fiscal year, as per VCT taxation regulation; c over relevant periods is as obtained 
from HM Revenue and Customs; and discount rate r = 4% p.a. In order to assess sensitivity of results to the 
value adopted for r, our estimations are repeated using r = 2%, 8% and 16% in the calculation of VIR. 
 
In this model, the expected sign of the VIR coefficient is positive, and that of the PB coefficient is 
negative. There is no firm sign expectation concerning the coefficient of VB: although increasing levels of 
variability are generally associated with increased inventory costs and, therefore, higher spreads, they might 
indicate a more active market and a resulting decrease in required spread. Neither are there firm expectations 
concerning the coefficients of BAR and VOL: increases in these variables are normally associated with 
increasing depth of market and, thus, decreasing spread, but, in the particular context of this paper, the 
occurrence of trades might stimulate market makers to increase spread. 
 
We allow for a difference response to ‘full’ VIR and its reduction attributable to bid price falling below 
initial subscription price by replacing the VIR variable of expression 6 with its VIRA and VIRB components, 
yielding a second estimable model as follows: 
 
tttttttt VOLBARVBPBVIRBVIRASPREAD εββββββα +++++++= 654321  (7) 
 
where VIRA and VIRB are calculated from expression (2), with assumptions, substitutions and estimated 
coefficient sign expectations as above (the expected sign of both the VIRA and VIRB coefficients is positive). 
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As discussed above, the VCT secondary market is relatively illiquid and this is reflected in a low level of 
variation in the spread of a number of VCTs. In order to have sufficient variation in the dependent variable, 
our regression analysis excludes VCTs with less than 30 changes in the spread, reducing our sample to 
seventeen ‘active’ VCT shares. 
 
Before estimation of the regressions, we must be satisfied as to the time series properties of the variables. 
Many financial time series follow a random walk (or test as such) and this may be true of our variables. To 
evaluate the possibility that the variables are nonstationary, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests were 
conducted for all the dependent and independent variable time series of the seventeen active VCTs.16 The 
results of ADF testing may be varied by, for example, variation in the number of lags employed; but the 
overall picture which emerged from our testing was one of widespread inability to reject the ADF null of 
nonstationarity (at 5% significance or better) in the VIRA, VIRB and PB series; and rejection of the null of 
nonstationarity for all but one of the VB and VOL time series and the majority of SPREAD time series. Had 
the tested order of integration been consistently I(1) or higher for the all the dependent and independent 
variables, the common and straightforward solution would have been to estimate our models in first 
differences; since we are principally interested in the behaviour of the spread over the required holding 
period and so a short-run model is feasible. In the present case, where we have stationarity in the dependent 
variable, but some independent variables stationary and others nonstationary, we must employ an equally 
straightforward but less often used model variation: taking first differences of the nonstationary variables, 
whilst retaining the stationary variable in levels: 
 
ttttttt VOLBARVBPBVIRSPREAD εβββββα ++++∆+∆+= 54321  (8) 
 
tttttttt VOLBARVBPBVIRBVIRASPREAD εββββββα ++++∆+∆+∆+= 654321  (9) 
 
These variations in model specification do impact on interpretation of the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients, but, crucially, not their expected sign. 
 
Finally, we present and discuss plots of SPREAD and VIR variables for each of the seventeen ‘active’ 
VCTs. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Observation and testing for a structural break 
 
Figure 2a shows a plot of mean VCT spread against number of days to/since the end of required holding 
period (‘relative day’); and Figure 2b shows mean VCT spread expressed as a proportion of bid price, again 
by relative day. Points are only plotted where data on ten or more of our VCT sample are available to 
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contribute to the mean for the relative day, in order that a small number of VCTs (or VCT market makers) 
may not dominate the profile. This leaves 3,511 plot points in each Figure, spanning the period from five 
years prior to end of required holding period, to a little over five years after. 
 
*** insert Figures 2a and 2b about here *** 
 
In both Figure 2a and Figure 2b, there is a relatively wide scatter of points in the period up to the end of 
required holding period, which tightens considerably after the end of the required holding period. Average 
VCT spread, with spread being measured in either absolute terms or as a proportion of bid price, appears to 
be higher prior to the end of the required holding period than after that point, albeit there is no discrete step 
at the end of the required holding period. Chow tests confirm a structural break in both sets of data at the end 
of the required holding period (in both cases at higher than the 1% level of significance).17 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics and comparisons 
 
Panel A of Table 2 gives summary statistics upon the mean value of the SPREAD variable for our VCT and 
comparator samples.18 The statistics are segmented between ‘all periods’, then ‘prior to end of required 
holding period’ and ‘after end of required holding period’ (the last two being pertinent only to the VCT 
sample). Panels B and C of Table 2 follow with descriptive statistics upon the mean value of SPREAD as a 
percentage of bid price, and mean number of customer bargains per day. Table 3 shows the results of 
pertinent comparison-of-mean tests. 
 
*** insert Table 2 about here *** 
 
The mean absolute spread for all VCTs within a five-year required holding period is 21.377 pence, with 
daily spread ranging between 1 and 550 pence; and for VCTs within a three-year required holding period the 
mean absolute spread is 17.719 pence, with spread ranging from 1 to 100 pence. By contrast, and in line with 
expectations under hypotheses A and E, the UK venture/development investment trust sector has a smaller 
mean spread of 10.888 pence over the same period. For UK growth investment trusts, the mean spread is 
smaller still, as is the standard deviation and range. Since there are rather more growth than 
venture/development investment trusts within our sample, combining the comparator samples results in 
statistics more closely resembling growth investment trusts. In terms of mean spread as a proportion of bid 
price, the difference between the two comparator samples is very small as compared to the difference 
between either one of them and the VCT sample; and the sense and significance of the results shown later in 
Table 3 (in respect of both spread and trading volume) are unaffected by taking comparisons of VCTs with 
either comparator sample alone instead of with the combined comparators. 
 
We expect the spread on VCTs to be larger during the required holding period (as compared to beyond it), 
in line with hypotheses C and E, and this confirmed by the lower half of Table 2, Panel A where the mean 
spreads post required holding period for VCTs with five-year and three-year required holding periods are, 
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respectively, 8.129 pence and 9.608 pence; compared with 21.337 pence and 17.719 pence respectively 
during required holding period. 
 
The price of our trusts are not constant over the sample period and this might naturally raise the concern 
that an interpretation of any differences in the absolute spreads will be misleading where market makers set 
spreads with regard, to some extent or other, of percentage of instrument value. Therefore, descriptive 
statistics upon spreads as a proportion of bid price are calculated and presented in Panel B of Table 2. Very 
similar conclusions may be drawn from this panel as are drawn from Panel A: we note that the spreads for 
VCTs are considerably larger than those for our comparator samples (consistent with hypotheses A and E); 
and that the spread for VCTs falls when the end of their required holding period is reached (consistent with 
hypotheses C and E). Our theoretical model also suggests that the VCTs with a three-year required holding 
period are, ceteris paribus, likely to have a higher spread than that in the earlier years of the required holding 
period of those VCTs with a five-year required holding period. This, hypothesis F, is supported by a mean 
proportion spread in for VCTs in the first three years of a five year required holding period being 0.01 lower 
than that for VCTs with a three-year required holding period (significant at better than 1%; Table 3, Panel B, 
line 3). 
 
A further topic of interest is whether the volume of trading is relatively small for VCTs within their 
holding period as compared with after and in comparison to more conventional instruments. Customer 
bargains per day are chosen as the basis for analysis since we are interested in the influence of tax effects on 
individuals’ decisions (and including market maker bargains would not provide a basis on which to compare 
the effects of changing tax liability on private shareholders). Table 2, Panel C is in line with expectations and 
hypothesis B and D: VCTs are very thinly traded during their required holding period, in comparison to 
VCTs beyond their required holding period and, most markedly, in comparison to our comparator investment 
trusts. Albeit the data upon comparator samples in this respect is not fully controlled (for, e.g., number of 
units in issue or value), the results are, we submit, stark and compelling. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of formal tests of the difference between the means as discussed above. All 
differences, supporting hypotheses A to F inclusive, are significant at the 1% level. A commentary upon 
some of the key comparisons follows. 
 
*** insert Table 3 about here *** 
 
The first and second rows of Table 3, Panel A present tests of whether the spread for VCTs falls when 
their five-year or three-year required holding period ends. The differences of 13.247 pence and 8.111 pence 
are both of the expected sign and statistically significant at a 1% level. Following the discussion of the 
statistics in Table 2, comparison of VCTs and our other sampled trusts is more appropriate if undertaken for 
proportion as opposed to absolute spreads. Table 3, Panel B therefore presents a comparison of the mean 
proportion spreads. We see in the first and second and rows of Table 3, Panel B that proportion spread for 
VCTs falls when their five-year or three-year required holding period ends (in confirmation of the findings 
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from Panel A, again significant at the 1% level in each case). In the third row of Panel B, we see that the 
VCTs within a three-year required holding period have a significantly higher mean proportion spread than 
those with a five-year required holding period. 
 
Since the proportion spreads on our two comparator samples are only marginally different (see Table 2, 
Panel B), we select the combined comparator sample as a basis for comparison with VCT percentage spreads 
in Table 3, Panel B. In each comparison, the percentage spread on VCTs is significantly greater than that of 
the comparators. This finding in isolation may indicate merely that the spread on VCTs is greater than that 
on more conventional investment trusts because the market is thinner, irrespective of whether the required 
holding period has ended (and, therefore, market makers require a greater spread to cover higher inventory 
costs). This possibility is controlled for in our regression analysis and addressed directly in hypotheses C and 
F. 
 
Panel C of Table 3 provides results of comparisons of number VCT customer bargains per day before 
versus after the end of their required holding periods; and between VCTs and comparators. Although the 
mean number of VCT customer bargains is relatively small both before and after the end of their required 
holding periods, the number per day after the end of the required holding periods is about three to ten 
(depending on the VCT subsample chosen) times the number observed before the end of the required holding 
periods (difference statistically significant at the 1% level). Trading in VCTs is markedly thinner than in the 
comparator samples, significant at the 1% level, albeit this result is subject to foregoing caveats. 
 
5.3 Regression estimations 
 
An earlier section discusses model development. The empirical models (8) and (9) were estimated for the 
period from supposed cash benefit of investment relief until end of required holding period (that is, for t’0 < t 
< t0+NY, the ‘middle section’ of model (1)) for each of the ‘active’ VCTs in our sample by the method 
ordinary least squares. The estimation results are summarised in Tables 4 and 5. In each estimated model, the 
coefficients of the regression are jointly significant per the F statistic. 
 
*** insert Tables 4 and 5 about here *** 
 
As regards the independent variables in the models designed to control for standard bid-ask spread, the 
estimated coefficient of ∆PB is negative in 24 of 34 cases (significant at generally acceptable levels of 
significance in fourteen of these cases); and the estimated coefficient of VB is also positive in 24 of 34 cases 
(significant in twenty of these cases). These results are consistent with, respectively, the ‘depth of market’ 
and ‘increased inventory costs’ hypotheses set out in section 4.3 above. 
 
In respect of our focal variables, however, the results are mixed. The estimated coefficient of ∆VIR 
(model 8) is positive in eight of seventeen cases (and significant in only two of these cases) and negative in 
eight cases (significant in two). Slightly stronger results to support hypothesis E come from estimation of 
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model (9), where the estimated coefficient of ∆VIRA is positive in fourteen of seventeen cases (significant in 
three cases), and negative in only three cases (none significant); and the estimated coefficient of ∆VIRB is 
positive in eight of seventeen cases (significant in only one) and negative in nine cases (significant in two).19 
 
A common feature of all the estimated models, however, is very low Durbin-Watson statistic – supporting 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no first order serial correlation in the error terms of the estimated models 
in favour of positive first order serial correlation. Given the nature of the dependant variable series as 
discussed in section 5.4 (below) this is unsurprising – indeed, supports the ‘stickiness’ finding from 
inspection of the SPREAD data (below). A consequence of this serial correlation in errors, however, is that 
the standard errors in the estimated models are likely to be suppressed, which would increase the t statistics 
and mean, in turn, that any significance claimed is generous. It is essential, therefore, to re-estimate the 
models using a procedure designed to control for any autocorrelation in the errors. The Hildreth-Lu 
procedure is appropriate for this task.20 The results from re-estimation under Hildreth-Lu are presented in 
Tables 6 and 7. The Hildreth-Lu procedure allows for an autoregressive structure in the regression errors. As 
expected, the regressions estimated under Hildreth-Lu show significantly increased R2 statistics, Durbin-
Watson statistics more closely grouped around 2, and estimated error autoregressive adjustment parameters 
(column ‘Rho’ in the Tables) is positive and significant in all cases. 
 
Results in respect of our focal variables remain mixed: The estimated coefficient of ∆VIR (model 8, 
estimated using Hildreth-Lu) is positive in five of seventeen cases (significant in three of these cases) and 
negative in twelve cases (significant in nine). Similar results come from estimation model (9) using Hildreth-
Lu, where the estimated coefficient of ∆VIRA is positive in six of seventeen cases (although not significant in 
any case); and the estimated coefficient of ∆VIRB is positive in six of seventeen cases (significant three 
cases). Regarding the estimated coefficients of ∆PB and VB, conclusions concerning the ‘depth of market’ 
and ‘increased inventory costs’ hypotheses are maintained. 
 
*** insert Tables 6 and 7 about here *** 
 
In order to assess sensitivity of results to the value adopted for r in our calculations of VIR from expression 
(1), our estimations are repeated with VIR calculated using, in turn, r = 2%, 8% and 16% (the foregoing 
being based on VIR calculated with r=4%p.a.). Results are essentially as reported above.21 
 
The mixed findings from regression analyses warrant further investigation. The next section presents and 
discusses plots of the data for these cases. 
 
5.4 Inspection and discussion of plots of SPREAD and VIR 
 
Figures 3.1 to 3.3 show three archetype plots of SPREAD and VIR, chosen to represent the plots of all 
seventeen ‘active’ VCT shares. The figures plot data from the point of investment relief cash flow benefit to 
the end of the required holding period (i.e., as used in the regression analysis). Eight of our seventeen active 
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VCTs give plots of the type in Figure 3.1; three of them give plots of the type in Figure 3.2; and six of them 
of the type in Figure 3.3. The plots for all seventeen VCTs are not reproduced in the interests of 
economy, but are available from the authors. Across the figures for all seventeen active VCTs, it is 
apparent that there is a certain ‘stickiness’ of variable SPREAD – to be a whole number of pence, commonly 
at either 5p or 10p, and often maintained at the same value for some considerable number of days. This 
explains readily the strong positive serial correlation seen in the errors of the regressions estimated by basic 
OLS (and evidenced in the low Durbin-Watson statistics): the dependent variable commonly stays constant 
for some period, during which the regression estimate of that variable rarely crosses the true value. 
 
*** insert Figure 3 (3.1, 3.2 and 3.3) about here *** 
 
Another feature of the figures is that SPREAD, although very high by conventional standards (James, 
2000 suggests a spread of 0.75% of market price within an overall upper bound of 1.80% on trading costs), is 
commonly lower than the value of VIR predicted by out theoretical model, as for the plots of eight VCTs of 
the type shown in Figure 3.1. In the plots for the three VCTs of the type shown in Figure 3.2, we see 
SPREAD lower than VIR for the most part of the required holding period, but jumping up to more closely 
track VIR towards the end of the required holding period. For the six VCTs whose plots are typified by 
Figure 3.3, we see SPREAD tracking VIR more closely throughout the required holding period, with 
SPREAD above VIR for some considerable periods. This last group is perhaps suggestive that some moving 
average in SPREAD follows VIR; but any such moving average could not be applicable to the other groups. 
What is clear is that there are a variety behaviours of SPREAD in relation to VIR; but that SPREAD is ever 
maintained at well above conventional levels.  
 
It is also apparent that 10p was a de facto upper limit on SPREAD over substantial periods for a number 
of the VCTs. Representing some 8% to 20% of the market value of shares commonly priced in the 50p – 
120p range, perhaps market makers simply could not conceive of the need for SPREAD above 10p. Indeed, 
our argument for the inclusion of VIR within SPREAD (section 2 above) led, inter alia, to a hypotheses of 
low trading volume for VCT share within required holding period (hypothesis B). This hypothesis is 
supported by our findings (section 5.2 above). The setting of SPREAD at an abnormally high level (as also 
confirmed by our section 5.2 findings), perhaps not incorporating the level of VIR exactly but informed by it, 
would effectively shut down the trading of VCT shares, forestalling any trades other than those made in 
extremis (by, for example, distressed sellers) – and protecting VCT market makers from the value loss which 
would be likely if SPREAD were set at more conventional levels. 
 
Drawing back from our sample of 17 active VCTs, and returning to our full sample of 108 VCTs (with an 
aggregate of 57,242 daily observations within required holding period), Figure 4 presents a histogram of 
deviations of SPREAD from VIR. The deviation of SPREAD from VIR is seen to cluster around zero; and 
approximately half of the observations of SPREAD are within 10p of VIR. There is a substantial tail to the 
right, in which some extraordinarily high values of SPREAD are seen – which, we submit, can only be the 
result of over-enthusiastic action to shut down trading by market makers. 
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*** insert Figure 4 about here *** 
 
Overall in sections 5.3 and 5.4, we find that SPREAD , way above conventional levels, is informed by 
VIR; and that VCT spread responds to factors such as price and volatility in a similar fashion to other 
instruments. These findings complement those set out in sections 5.1 and 5.2 to confirm that tax effects are 
priced into the spread and that price and trading behaviour in the VCT market conforms substantially to 
theory and associated expectations. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper documents theoretical and empirical evidence of a lock-in effect arising from the conditional 
nature of tax incentives provided to increase demand for Venture Capital Trust IPOs. In particular, VCT bid-
ask spreads evolve over time in a way that is consistent with investment relief being valued in the share price 
by the shareholder during the required holding period, after the end of which the spread falls significantly; 
and/or with market makers setting spread to effectively shut down trading in VCT shares within the required 
holding period. Evidence of tax effects exists where the spread is greater for VCTs than it is for comparators 
in respect of which conditional tax incentives do not exist; and where spreads are greater for VCTs with a 
three-year as opposed to a five-year required holding period. In essence, the non-transferability of investment 
relief from initial subscribers to secondary purchasers results in a significant divergence of these respective 
parties’ valuations. Consistent with the influence of the required holding period on investor behaviour, the 
number of customer bargains is minimal during this period and increases significantly thereafter. Although 
there are potential non-tax explanations, there is evidence that VCT trading volume less than that for 
comparable non-VCT investment vehicles. Circumstantial evidence in the form of buy backs is also 
consistent with the presence of a lock-in effect. 
 
This study is novel in that the magnitude of the lock-in effect can be calculated with certainty without 
requiring access to confidential shareholder information. In addition, a further methodological opportunity is 
provided by an unexpected change in related taxation legislation (as regards length of required holding 
period). 
 
Our results lead to a questioning of the benefit of requiring VCTs to be listed companies. This is 
reinforced by the relatively low importance attached to exit strategy concerns by VCT shareholders at the 
time of subscribing. A listing may bring benefits such as increased monitoring, suggesting reduced agency 
costs between managers and shareholders; but, conversely, agency costs may be increased because it is so 
expensive for shareholders, in the event of displeasure with directors’ actions, to dispose of their VCT 
holding with the required holding period. An interesting question is whether the purported benefits of a full 
market listing exceed the direct and indirect costs associated with obtaining and maintaining that listing. 
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1
 In order to comply with European Commission regulation of state aid this requirement will be relaxed to require 
listing on any ‘European Union Regulated Market’ (HM Treasury, 2009a). The necessary legislation will be included in 
the Finance Bill 2010. 
2
 In general, financial institutions and non UK income tax payers dominate the ownership of UK quoted companies. As 
at 31 December 2001 UK tax-exempt pension funds held 16% of the market value of the London Stock Exchange and 
UK insurance companies whose business also includes tax-exempt pension funds held a further 20%. The largest 
shareholding group was non-UK institutions and individuals, which held 36% (Office of National Statistics, 2002). At 
31 December 2006 a similar position held, the respective percentages were 13%, 15% and 40% (Office of National 
Statistics, 2007).  
3
 After allowing a three-year period in which to identify and appraise potential investments, at least 70% of the VCT’s 
investments must comprise new issues in unquoted trading companies. Of this 70%, at least 30% must be in the form of 
equity, and the balance may be preference or debt capital. 
4
 In an attempt to ensure a diversified portfolio, no single holding may exceed 15% of the VCT’s investments. 
5
 In order to target investment at small, unquoted funds, there is an upper limit on the size of companies in which VCTs 
may invest. Immediately prior to investment by the VCT, the gross assets of the investment target company must not 
exceed £15m; and immediately after, they may not exceed £16m (prior to 6th April 1998 the corresponding figures were 
£10m and £11m). 
6 Discussions with VCT managers indicate, however, that VCT investors rarely consider exit strategy options at the 
time of initial subscription. This view is consistent with the findings reported in PACEC (2003). 
7
 Liquidity could also be provided under general powers available to all limited companies (S.163, Companies Act 
1985) to make market purchases or buy-backs of their own shares. All of the seventeen VCTs focused upon in section 
5.3 and Tables 4 and 5 (see subsequent discussion) have adopted such powers. The terms of the permitted buy-backs, 
based on a review of the buy-back terms of ten of the eighteen VCTs, indicates that the maximum price permitted is 
based on 105% of mid-market price (6 VCTS) or the lower of 105% of the mid-market price and net asset value (4 
VCTs). Clearly, under both mechanisms of price determination, the conditional form of the investment relief will still 
create a lock-in effect, although taking a mid-market price reduces its magnitude. 
8
 In his budget speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced on 17th March 2004 a series of changes to the nature 
of the tax incentives. For shares issued on or after 6 April 2004 the rate of income tax relief for investments was to be 
increased from 20% to 40%; capital gains tax deferral relief was no longer available for gains reinvested in VCT; and 
the annual taxpayer VCT investment limits was raised from £100,000 to £200,000. These changes recognised the 
primacy of income tax related reliefs over gain deferral or roll over relief. 
9
 Subject originally to an upper investment limit of £100,000 per fiscal year per individual, later raised (see previous 
footnote).  
10
 We assume rationality in the repayment of overdue tax, that is, given the usual level of clawback interest rate in 
comparison to expected risk adjusted asset returns, that overdue tax will be paid immediately a liability is recognised. 
11
 As might be expected, later analysis shows a significant correlation between VIR and bid price, which is used as a 
control variable in the multivariate regression analysis which follows. The use of VIR decomposed into variables VIRA 
and VIRB partially overcomes the potential multicollinearity present when using a single VIR variable. See endnote 18 
for further details. 
12
 These 137 are represented in Table 1 as 125 new issues, 1997-98 onwards, plus 12 of the 14 issues in 1995-1996 and 
1996-1997 where no split between new issues and further issues is reported. 
13
 It was necessary to complete the collection of the required data set by purchasing the volume data directly from the 
London Stock Exchange because of Datastream’s decision not to collect data on number of customer bargains and 
number of shares traded therein from 27th March 2002. 
14
 The exclusion of PB between zero and one pence entailed the removal of relatively few observations, but avoided 
extreme values arising when SPREAD was considered as a proportion of PB (see later section). Comparability with the 
VCT sample is not compromised, however, since the smallest PB observation in the VCT sample was four pence. 
15
 Since the London Stock Exchange was unable to provide data on daily trading prior to 1st October 1997, the final 
samples included (respectively) only 145,124, 24,517 and 44,388 daily observations for number of customer bargains 
and number of shares traded in customer bargains. 
16
 See Enders (1995) or Greene (2000) for a discussion of the ADF test and appropriate responses where series test as 
nonstationary. 
17
 The spread declines just before the end of the holding period The implication is that the required holding period 
ended in fact, on average, just prior to the date which we calculated. A possible reason is our calculations were 
necessarily based on the listing date of the VCT shares; yet required holding properly runs from subscription date, 
which often preceded the listing date. We thank a reviewer for drawing our attention to this observation. 
18
 All but two of the VCTs in our sample were issued at a price of 100p per share. One VCT was issued at a price of 98p 
per share; and another at 20p per share. 
19
 The mean correlation coefficient between the variables ∆VIR and ∆PB is 0.751 for the sample of 17 active VCTs. 
When the decomposed variables are used, the mean correlation coefficient between ∆VIRA and ∆PB is -0.026; and that 
between ∆VIRB and ∆PB is 0.752. A number of individual coefficients, however, are in excess of 0.9. Therefore, there 
is a strong possibility that the reported results are affected by multicollinearity with respect to the variables ∆VIR and 
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∆PB in the first model and ∆VIRB and ∆PB and in the second model. None of the correlation coefficients amongst the 
other control variables are ‘high’ (the highest value being 0.552, as between VOL and BAR). 
20
 In preference, for example, to the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure, which, unlike Hildreth-Lu, is susceptible to finding 
local rather than global optima. 
21
 The only noteworthy deviations are in OLS estimation of model (9), where, when r=8% or 16% is adopted, the 
number of estimated ∆VIRA coefficients are reduced to eight or seven (respectively) out of seventeen, of which seven 
are significant; i.e., reduced incidence of positive estimates of the ∆VIRA coefficient, but increased incidence of 
significant positive estimates. 
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Table 1                 
VCT issues in fiscal years 1995/96 to 2008/09       
            
New issues  Further issues  Total Fiscal year Number Proceeds (£m)  Number Proceeds (£m)  Number Proceeds (£m) 
            
VCTs with five-year 
required holding period          
  1995-1996 split not reported  10 138.6 
  1996-1997 split not reported  4 30.2 
  1997-1998 4 33.6  10 7.3  14 40.9 
  1998-1999 7 83.2  66 75.3  73 158.6 
  1999-2000 8 77.1  91 147.3  99 224.4 
            
VCTs with three-year 
required holding period          
  2000-2001 17 193.4  112 189.5  129 382.9 
  2001-2002 13 66.4  200 156.5  213 222.8 
  2002-2003 2 7.5  179 181.6  181 189.0 
  2003-2004 0 0.0  181 61.5  181 61.5 
  2004-2005 21 80.6  244 295.6  265 376.2 
  2005-2006 24 116.0  369 618.3  393 734.3 
  2006-2007 11 90.7  155 299.8  166 390.5 
  2007-2008 10 53.6  130 141.3  140 194.9 
  2008-2009 8 40.7  162 139.3  170 180.0 
            
  Total 125 842.8  1,899 2,313.4  2,038 3,325.0 
            
Sources:          
  Primary Market Fact Sheet, various months, London Stock Exchange (re: 1995/96 and 1996/97) 
  New Issues and IPOs Summary, London Stock Exchange (re: 1997/98 onwards) 
  Further Issues Summary, London Stock Exchange (re: 1997/98 onwards) 
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Figure 1 
Profile of valuation of investment relief over time 
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Table 2           
Descriptive statistics       
   Mean SD Min Max n 
Panel A: SPREAD in pence       
All periods       
  VCTs with a five-year required holding period 15.409 22.367 0.25 550.00 77,849 
  VCTs with a three-year required holding period 14.773 10.653 0.25 100.00 70,779 
  All VCTs 15.106 17.781 0.25 550.00 148,628 
  Comparator sample: UK venture/development 10.888 15.817 0.50 100.00 26,442 
  Comparator sample: UK growth 6.976 12.260 0.25 90.00 48,489 
  All comparators 8.356 13.749 0.25 100.00 74,931 
Prior to end of required holding period       
  VCTs with a five-year required holding period 21.377 28.270 1.00 550.00 42,781 
  VCTs with a three-year required holding period 17.719 11.089 1.00 100.00 45,069 
  All VCTs 19.500 21.345 1.00 550.00 87,850 
After end of required holding period       
  VCTs with a five-year required holding period 8.129 6.257 0.25 50.00 35,068 
  VCTs with a three-year required holding period 9.608 7.415 0.25 40.00 25,710 
  All VCTs 8.755 6.810 0.25 50.00 60,778 
         
Panel B: SPREAD as a proportion of bid price       
All periods       
  VCTs with a five-year required holding period 0.240 0.344 0.0067 9.00 77,849 
  VCTs with a three-year required holding period 0.235 0.316 0.0030 6.00 70,779 
  All VCTs 0.238 0.331 0.0030 9.00 148,628 
  Comparator sample: UK venture/development 0.056 0.101 0.0004 1.19 26,442 
  Comparator sample: UK growth 0.042 0.132 0.0006 6.00 48,489 
  All comparators 0.047 0.122 0.0004 6.00 74,931 
Prior to end of required holding period       
  VCTs with a five-year required holding period 0.302 0.435 0.0106 9.00 42,781 
  VCTs with a three-year required holding period 0.264 0.361 0.0101 6.00 45,069 
  All VCTs 0.283 0.399 0.0101 9.00 87,850 
After end of required holding period       
  VCTs with a five-year required holding period 0.165 0.149 0.0067 2.50 35,068 
  VCTs with a three-year required holding period 0.184 0.206 0.0030 1.20 25,710 
  All VCTs 0.173 0.176 0.0030 2.50 60,778 
         
Panel C: Customer bargains per day       
All periods       
  VCTs with a five-year required holding period 0.218 0.821 0 74 74,345 
  VCTs with a three-year required holding period 0.145 0.584 0 40 70,779 
  All VCTs 0.183 0.716 0 74 145,124 
  Comparator sample: UK venture/development 2.888 4.276 0 79 24,517 
  Comparator sample: UK growth 6.477 9.378 0 206 44,388 
  All comparators 5.200 8.131 0 206 68,905 
Prior to end of required holding period       
  VCTs with a five-year required holding period 0.110 0.807 0 74 39,277 
  VCTs with a three-year required holding period 0.030 0.207 0 6 45,069 
  All VCTs 0.067 0.573 0 74 84,346 
After end of required holding period       
  VCTs with a five-year required holding period 0.340 0.820 0 31 35,068 
  VCTs with a three-year required holding period 0.349 0.894 0 40 25,710 
  All VCTs 0.343 0.852 0 40 60,778 
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Table 3           
Comparison of means       
   
Difference in 
mean 
Hypothesised 
sign 
Associated 
hypotheses 
t 
statistic Sig. 
Panel A: Mean value of SPREAD in pence       
  VCTs with 5 yr RHP: within RHP versus beyond RHP 13.247 +ve C, E 94.15 * 
  VCTs with 3 yr RHP: within RHP versus beyond RHP 8.111 +ve C, E 116.26 * 
         
Panel B: Mean value of SPREAD as a proportion of bid price       
  VCTs with 5 yr RHP: within RHP versus beyond RHP 0.137 +ve C, E 61.16 * 
  VCTs with 3 yr RHP: within RHP versus beyond RHP 0.080 +ve C, E 37.59 * 
  VCTs within RHP: with 5 yr RHPa vs. with 3 yr RHP -0.010 -ve F -3.52 * 
  VCTs within 5 yr RHP versus comparators 0.255 +ve A, C, E 118.59 * 
  VCTs within 3 yr RHP versus comparators 0.217 +ve A, C, E 123.62 * 
  All VCTs within RHP versus comparators 0.235 +ve A, C, E 166.09 * 
  VCTs beyond 5 yr RHP versus comparators 0.117 n/a n/a 129.08 * 
  VCTs beyond 3 yr RHP versus comparators 0.137 n/a n/a 100.51 * 
  All VCTs beyond RHP versus comparators 0.126 n/a n/a 149.57 * 
         
Panel C: Mean number of customer bargains per day       
  VCTs with 5 yr RHP: beyond RHP versus within RHP 0.230 +ve D 38.37 * 
  VCTs with 3 yr RHP: beyond RHP versus within RHP 0.319 +ve D 56.39 * 
  VCTs within 5 yr RHP versus comparators -5.090 -ve B -162.91 * 
  VCTs within 3 yr RHP versus comparators -5.170 -ve B -166.83 * 
  All VCTs within RHP versus comparators -5.133 -ve B -165.37 * 
  VCTs beyond 5 yr RHP versus comparators -4.860 n/a n/a -155.35 * 
  VCTs beyond 3 yr RHP versus comparators -4.851 n/a n/a -154.14 * 
  All VCTs beyond RHP versus comparators -4.856 n/a n/a -155.81 * 
         
The difference in mean of 'x versus y' is calculated as x-y.       
*  indicates significance at the 1% level or better       
a
 considering observations in the first three years of the RHP, for consistency with VCTs with a three year RHP   
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Table 4                     
Estimation of SPREAD = α + β1∆VIR + β2∆PB + β3VB + β4BAR + β5VOL + ε using OLS for 17 active VCTs   
             
No. Const. ∆VIR ∆PB VB BAR VOL Adj. R2 n F DW 
           
1 6.3274 -4.2373 0.7812 0.3097 -0.4469 0.0000 0.29 724 F(5,718) 0.05 
  (22.34***) (-0.40) (0.30) (16.77***) (-5.95***) (2.97***)   (59.93***)   
2 11.1054 0.8389 -0.2147 0.0036 0.2659 0.0000 0.08 757 F(5,751) 0.03 
  (31.25***) (0.46) (-1.96**) (1.04) (3.32***) (0.46)   (13.73***)   
3 7.9409 1.5519 -0.4632 -0.0002 0.0256 0.0000 0.16 856 F(5,850) 0.15 
  (60.39***) (0.48) (-0.63) (-0.04) (0.94) (-11.18***)   (34.16***)   
4 8.0965 1.8008 -0.6607 -0.0164 -0.0742 0.0000 0.08 856 F(5,850) 0.20 
  (73.26***) (0.49) (-0.74) (-1.02) (-2.76***) (-2.29**)   (16.07***)   
5 7.6556 -4.4562 0.7921 -0.0686 0.0558 0.0000 0.02 856 F(5,850) 0.05 
  (58.96***) (-0.69) (0.55) (-2.03**) (1.89*) (-3.33***)   (3.74***)   
6 15.8393 0.8610 -0.6487 0.3463 -0.6940 0.0000 0.48 856 F(5,850) 0.06 
  (34.25***) (0.13) (-0.45) (26.89***) (-8.17***) (-1.25)   (157.77***)   
7 10.5641 7.9912 -2.1481 0.1915 0.2677 -0.0001 0.21 852 F(5,846) 0.08 
  (35.58***) (1.41*) (-1.55*) (11.60***) (3.89***) (-9.24***)   (47.21***)   
8 21.4314 5.1395 -1.8848 0.2168 5.1649 -0.0002 0.36 856 F(5,850) 0.03 
  (29.33***) (1.15) (-2.25**) (16.59***) (10.61***) (-4.77***)   (95.76***)   
9 7.8545 -1.2083 -0.0160 0.0021 -0.0494 0.0000 0.03 855 F(5,849) 0.26 
  (58.47***) (-1.95**) (-0.43) (3.40***) (-3.22***) (-2.32**)   (6.17***)   
10 7.2440 -1.6771 0.0078 0.1981 -0.0855 0.0000 0.11 1,051 F(5,1045) 0.08 
  (68.28***) (-0.46) (0.01) (10.98***) (-1.69*) (-2.84***)   (26.98***)   
11 6.3559 -3.1116 0.2012 -0.0095 0.0115 0.0000 0.01 802 F(5,796) 0.07 
  (34.35***) (-0.60) (0.18) (-0.31) (0.35) (0.33)   (2.78**)   
12 13.9393 -0.3193 0.1337 0.0013 0.1350 -0.0001 0.62 958 F(5,952) 0.33 
  (28.10***) (-0.30) (5.04***) (5.57***) (7.43***) (-7.37***)   (307.52***)   
13 10.3084 -1.5934 0.0002 0.0481 0.4040 0.0000 0.08 1,039 F(5,1033) 0.09 
  (42.77***) (-0.32) (0.00) (5.52***) (5.27***) (-4.34***)   (20.15***)   
14 9.2912 -2.9236 -0.0076 0.0001 -0.0976 0.0000 0.06 1,040 F(5,1034) 0.09 
  (62.12***) (-3.63***) (-0.18) (0.09) (-4.54***) (2.49**)   (14.33***)   
15 10.4576 0.3762 -0.1683 -0.0003 0.8075 0.0000 0.51 963 F(5,957) 0.20 
  (67.64***) (0.55) (-2.70***) (-0.20) (27.39***) (-5.29***)   (200.65***)   
16 13.1326 -0.9150 -0.1911 0.0595 2.7257 -0.0001 0.76 974 F(5,968) 0.16 
  (30.34***) (-0.51) (-1.54*) (21.06***) (31.08***) (-16.93***)   (630.97***)   
17 4.4066 17.1149 -3.7912 0.0478 -0.1474 0.0000 0.08 1,052 F(5,1046) 0.12 
  (43.00***) (3.64***) (-4.08***) (5.16***) (-2.77***) (-1.17)   (19.26***)   
             
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%.       
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Table 5                       
Estimation of SPREAD = α + β1∆VIRA + β2∆VIRB +β3∆PB + β4VB + β5BAR + β6VOL + ε using OLS for 17 active VCTs 
  
            
No. Const. ∆VIRA ∆VIRB ∆PB VB BAR VOL Adj. R2 n F DW 
   
   
        
1 6.1692 11.6795 -7.0990 1.4797 0.3091 -0.4477 0.0000 0.29 724 F(6,717) 0.05 
  (16.83***) (0.45) (-0.62) (0.53) (16.72***) (-5.96***) (2.98***)   (49.98***)   
2 10.5219 60.1702 0.8951 -0.2212 0.0036 0.2638 0.0000 0.08 757 F(6,750) 0.04 
  (19.16***) (1.41*) (0.49) (-2.02**) (1.04) (3.29***) (0.49)   (11.78***)   
3 7.8978 5.7433 1.2570 -0.3961 -0.0003 0.0260 0.0000 0.16 856 F(6,849) 0.15 
  (45.93***) (0.51) (0.38) (-0.52) (-0.06) (0.95) (-11.18***)   (28.46***)   
4 8.1087 0.5540 1.9385 -0.6943 -0.0164 -0.0742 0.0000 0.08 856 F(6,849) 0.20 
  (53.95***) (0.05) (0.50) (-0.74) (-1.02) (-2.76***) (-2.29**)   (13.38***)   
5 7.5483 6.1223 -6.3963 1.2318 -0.0682 0.0545 0.0000 0.02 856 F(6,849) 0.05 
  (40.53***) (0.42) (-0.92) (0.80) (-2.01**) (1.84*) (-3.30***)   (3.22***)   
6 15.7780 7.1523 0.7538 -0.6237 0.3463 -0.6945 0.0000 0.48 856 F(6,849) 0.06 
  (24.80***) (0.16) (0.12) (-0.43) (26.87***) (-8.16***) (-1.24)   (131.32***)   
7 10.2945 35.5351 6.4709 -1.7736 0.1904 0.2674 -0.0001 0.21 852 F(6,845) 0.09 
  (27.89***) (1.54*) (1.12) (-1.25) (11.52***) (3.89***) (-9.24***)   (39.62***)   
8 19.6848 181.8245 5.1390 -1.8714 0.2168 5.1632 -0.0002 0.36 856 F(6,849) 0.04 
  (15.74***) (1.77**) (1.15) (-2.23**) (16.61***) (10.61***) (-4.79***)   (80.47***)   
9 7.7873 5.8191 -1.2210 -0.0152 0.0021 -0.0498 0.0000 0.03 855 F(6,848) 0.27 
  (41.41***) (0.42) (-1.97**) (-0.41) (3.42***) (-3.24***) (-2.32**)   (5.18***)   
10 7.3385 -11.9774 -0.9750 -0.1608 0.1978 -0.0836 0.0000 0.11 1,051 F(6,1044) 0.08 
  (46.79***) (-0.91) (-0.26) (-0.18) (10.97***) (-1.66*) (-2.83***)   (22.59***)   
11 6.1273 21.9077 -5.3728 0.6999 -0.0091 0.0089 0.0000 0.01 802 F(6,795) 0.08 
  (25.38***) (1.23) (-1.00) (0.60) (-0.29) (0.27) (0.37)   (2.69**)   
12 14.3363 -45.5775 -0.3102 0.1329 0.0013 0.1351 -0.0001 0.62 958 F(6,951) 0.33 
  (19.09***) (-0.71) (-0.29) (5.01***) (5.55***) (7.43***) (-7.36***)   (256.21***)   
13 10.5044 -24.0903 -0.9618 -0.1365 0.0482 0.4045 0.0000 0.08 1,039 F(6,1032) 0.09 
  (29.96***) (-0.81) (-0.19) (-0.13) (5.54***) (5.28***) (-4.33***)   (16.88***)   
14 9.1997 7.8173 -2.9420 -0.0064 0.0001 -0.0980 0.0000 0.06 1,040 F(6,1033) 0.10 
  (40.85***) (0.40) (-3.65***) (-0.15) (0.10) (-4.56***) (2.48**)   (11.98***)   
15 10.2665 22.6125 0.3395 -0.1630 -0.0003 0.8073 0.0000 0.51 963 F(6,956) 0.20 
  (39.48***) (0.93) (0.49) (-2.60***) (-0.20) (27.38***) (-5.28***)   (167.32***)   
16 13.1210 0.4509 -0.9159 -0.1913 0.0595 2.7257 -0.0001 0.76 974 F(6,967) 0.16 
  (20.35***) (0.01) (-0.51) (-1.54*) (21.04***) (31.06***) (-16.91***)   (525.27***)   
17 4.5129 3.9420 18.2484 -4.0130 0.0477 -0.1450 0.0000 0.08 1,052 F(6,1045) 0.13 
  (31.73***) (0.30) (3.78***) (-4.22***) (5.15***) (-2.73***) (-1.16)   (16.25***)   
              
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%.             
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Table 6                       
Estimation of SPREAD = α + β1∆VIR + β2∆PB + β3VB + β4BAR + β5VOL + ε using Hildreth-Lu for 17 active VCTs   
              
No. Const. ∆VIR ∆PB VB BAR VOL Rho Adj. R2 n F DW 
              
1 7.6385 0.3329 -0.4386 0.0809 -0.0199 0.0000 0.9882 0.97 723 F(6,716) 1.96 
  (2.68***) (0.21) (-1.14) (1.95*) (-0.26) (1.89*) (138.35***)   (3,742.73***)   
2 15.3921 -0.4565 -0.0341 0.0033 0.1413 0.0000 0.9922 0.98 756 F(6,749) 2.17 
  (3.00***) (-2.30**) (-2.65***) (1.15) (3.12***) (-0.36) (179.90***)   (5,801.24***)   
3 7.3750 2.5673 -0.7545 -0.0016 -0.0257 0.0000 0.9363 0.89 855 F(6,848) 2.04 
  (15.97***) (2.89***) (-3.68***) (-0.12) (-0.56) (-1.43) (77.60***)   (1,100.26***)   
4 7.9544 0.3784 -0.4392 0.0141 -0.0654 0.0000 0.9048 0.83 855 F(6,848) 2.05 
  (21.38***) (0.34) (-1.62*) (0.34) (-1.38) (-1.22) (61.42***)   (708.71***)   
5 7.5032 2.6951 -0.9525 0.0175 0.0956 0.0000 0.9778 0.96 855 F(6,848) 2.01 
  (8.60***) (2.80***) (-4.47***) (0.30) (2.26**) (-1.58) (136.69***)   (3,079.02***)   
6 14.9883 -2.2705 0.1300 0.0638 0.1482 0.0000 0.9867 0.98 855 F(6,848) 1.74 
  (3.32***) (-2.22**) (0.57) (2.58***) (1.27) (-0.82) (172.64***)   (5,864.18***)   
7 11.1839 -0.0703 -0.1244 0.0605 -0.0873 0.0000 0.9779 0.95 851 F(6,844) 2.14 
  (6.71***) (-0.07) (-0.52) (1.59) (-1.28) (2.74***) (130.26***)   (2,848.82***)   
8 31.2744 4.1648 -1.2591 0.0215 1.6144 0.0000 0.9932 0.99 855 F(6,848) 1.61 
  (2.44**) (9.62***) (-15.39***) (1.33) (3.89***) (-1.35) (249.35***)   (11,709.06***)   
9 7.6964 -1.0799 -0.0708 0.0000 -0.0340 0.0000 0.8742 0.76 854 F(6,847) 2.14 
  (18.09***) (-4.32***) (-4.12***) (0.02) (-0.87) (0.12) (51.44***)   (460.66***)   
10 7.1308 -0.4554 -0.2328 0.0826 0.0785 0.0000 0.9639 0.93 1,050 F(6,1043) 2.09 
  (12.12***) (-0.65) (-1.42*) (2.25**) (1.14) (-1.22) (116.65***)   (2,487.65***)   
11 6.1396 -4.3560 0.5229 0.0521 0.0754 0.0000 0.9645 0.93 801 F(6,794) 1.71 
  (7.76***) (-4.35***) (2.38***) (0.85) (1.25) (-0.30) (103.46***)   (1,815.09***)   
12 11.8924 -0.8607 -0.0134 0.0002 0.1151 0.0000 0.8867 0.90 957 F(6,950) 2.68 
  (6.86***) (-2.18**) (-1.21) (0.47) (3.16***) (0.33) (57.29***)   (1,481.39***)   
13 11.2361 -2.5440 0.1544 0.0285 -0.1043 0.0000 0.9593 0.92 1,038 F(6,1031) 2.06 
  (9.36***) (-2.36***) (0.68) (1.50) (-1.04) (-1.57) (108.99***)   (2,059.56***)   
14 9.1568 -1.9649 -0.0107 -0.0016 -0.0243 0.0000 0.9561 0.92 1,039 F(6,1032) 2.48 
  (12.05***) (-11.09***) (-0.91) (-1.22) (-0.58) (1.21) (102.89***)   (1,877.85***)   
15 12.5365 -0.3881 -0.0488 -0.0021 0.1000 0.0000 0.9522 0.92 962 F(6,955) 2.05 
  (10.85***) (-1.87**) (-2.49***) (-0.43) (1.13) (-0.22) (91.61***)   (1,734.63***)   
16 20.0591 -0.3626 -0.1216 0.0124 0.9717 0.0000 0.9742 0.97 973 F(6,966) 2.22 
  (4.74***) (-0.75) (-3.51***) (1.50) (5.20***) (-2.59***) (131.27***)   (5,035.23***)   
17 4.0203 -1.2848 0.1707 -0.0034 0.0859 0.0000 0.9655 0.94 1,051 F(6,1044) 2.45 
  (7.82***) (-1.38*) (0.93) (-0.16) (1.62) (-1.34) (124.43***)   (2,584.78***)   
              
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%.             
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Table 7                         
Estimation of SPREAD = α + β1∆VIRA + β2∆VIRB +β3∆PB + β4VB + β5BAR + β6VOL + ε using Hildreth-Lu for 17 active VCTs   
               
No. Const. ∆VIRA ∆VIRB ∆PB VB BAR VOL Rho Adj. R2 n F DW 
1 7.6700 -2.0268 0.8603 -0.5670 0.0806 -0.0197 0.0000 0.9882 0.97 723 F(7,715) 1.96 
  (2.69***) (-0.59) (0.51) (-1.35*) (1.94*) (-0.25) (1.88*) (138.36***)   (3,206.29***)   
2 15.4260 -3.7821 -0.4584 -0.0334 0.0033 0.1427 0.0000 0.9922 0.98 756 F(7,748) 2.17 
  (3.00***) (-0.91) (-2.31**) (-2.59***) (1.14) (3.15***) (-0.39) (179.89***)   (4,970.23***)   
3 7.3967 0.5190 2.7766 -0.8020 -0.0015 -0.0272 0.0000 0.9364 0.89 855 F(7,847) 2.03 
  (15.95***) (0.19) (3.00***) (-3.75***) (-0.11) (-0.59) (-1.38) (77.64***)   (942.75***)   
4 7.9917 -2.2279 0.7581 -0.5312 0.0144 -0.0681 0.0000 0.9048 0.83 855 F(7,847) 2.05 
  (21.35***) (-0.71) (0.63) (-1.83**) (0.35) (-1.44) (-1.21) (61.41***)   (607.44***)   
5 7.5760 -2.8784 3.8629 -1.2179 0.0184 0.0886 0.0000 0.9781 0.96 855 F(7,847) 1.99 
  (8.63***) (-1.44*) (3.77***) (-5.35***) (0.31) (2.10**) (-1.48) (137.45***)   (2,668.95***)   
6 14.9325 1.9510 -2.3544 0.1492 0.0640 0.1509 0.0000 0.9867 0.98 855 F(7,847) 1.74 
  (3.30***) (0.32) (-2.29**) (0.65) (2.59***) (1.29) (-0.83) (172.60***)   (5,023.42***)   
7 11.2033 -2.1053 0.0518 -0.1546 0.0607 -0.0865 0.0000 0.9779 0.95 851 F(7,843) 2.14 
  (6.72***) (-0.57) (0.05) (-0.63) (1.60) (-1.27) (2.72***) (130.18***)   (2,439.95***)   
8 31.4427 -11.1551 4.1799 -1.2627 0.0219 1.6007 0.0000 0.9932 0.99 855 F(7,847) 1.61 
  (2.45**) (-1.24) (9.66***) (-15.44***) (1.35) (3.86***) (-1.29) (249.68***)   (10,059.44***)   
9 7.7451 -6.3284 -1.0665 -0.0725 0.0000 -0.0335 0.0000 0.8746 0.76 854 F(7,846) 2.14 
  (18.07***) (-1.37*) (-4.26***) (-4.20***) (-0.01) (-0.86) (0.14) (51.50***)   (395.18***)   
10 7.1215 0.4875 -0.5313 -0.2146 0.0831 0.0779 0.0000 0.9639 0.93 1,050 F(7,1042) 2.09 
  (12.10***) (0.21) (-0.73) (-1.27) (2.26**) (1.13) (-1.21) (116.60***)   (2,130.63***)   
11 6.1447 -5.1248 -4.2645 0.5026 0.0519 0.0764 0.0000 0.9645 0.93 801 F(7,793) 1.71 
  (7.76***) (-1.69**) (-4.03***) (2.16**) (0.85) (1.27) (-0.31) (103.42***)   (1,553.99***)   
12 11.8627 2.4279 -0.8627 -0.0133 0.0002 0.1152 0.0000 0.8867 0.90 957 F(7,949) 2.68 
  (6.79***) (0.11) (-2.18**) (-1.20) (0.46) (3.16***) (0.33) (57.27***)   (1,268.46***)   
13 11.1826 4.1155 -2.7717 0.2043 0.0283 -0.1052 0.0000 0.9594 0.92 1,038 F(7,1030) 2.07 
  (9.30***) (0.73) (-2.53***) (0.88) (1.49) (-1.05) (-1.58) (109.06***)   (1,766.33***)   
14 9.2253 -10.1996 -1.9416 -0.0125 -0.0016 -0.0249 0.0000 0.9563 0.92 1,039 F(7,1031) 2.49 
  (12.09***) (-2.64***) (-10.95***) (-1.06) (-1.25) (-0.59) (1.29) (103.11***)   (1,615.79***)   
15 12.5369 -0.4423 -0.3880 -0.0488 -0.0021 0.1000 0.0000 0.9522 0.92 962 F(7,954) 2.05 
  (10.83***) (-0.07) (-1.87**) (-2.48***) (-0.43) (1.13) (-0.22) (91.56***)   (1,485.27***)   
16 20.0929 -4.2012 -0.3615 -0.1214 0.0124 0.9715 0.0000 0.9742 0.97 973 F(7,965) 2.22 
  (4.74***) (-0.32) (-0.75) (-3.50***) (1.50) (5.20***) (-2.58***) (131.23***)   (4,311.84***)   
17 3.9900 2.4115 -1.7629 0.2645 -0.0046 0.0869 0.0000 0.9657 0.94 1,051 F(7,1043) 2.44 
  (7.73***) (1.08) (-1.83**) (1.39*) (-0.22) (1.64) (-1.39) (124.71***)   (2,220.91***)   
               
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%.               
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Figure 3       
Plot of SPREAD and VIR for seventeen 'active' VCTs (pence)  
Data from investment relief cash flow benefit date to end of required holding period 
(key: SPREAD plots in plain; VIR plots in bold)   
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